

## ROMANS AS BAPBAPOI: THREE POLYBIAN SPEECHES AND THE POLITICS OF CULTURAL INDETERMINACY

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THE SPEECHES IN POLYBIUS' *HISTORIES* provide important insights into what is perhaps the most controversial topic in Polybian studies: the Greek historian's attitudes towards Rome. A great deal of modern scholarly debate has revolved around mutually exclusive interpretations that Polybius was essentially either pro-Roman or anti-Roman.<sup>1</sup> A close reading of the *Histories* suggests a more nuanced approach to the question of Polybius' views on Rome. Viewing Polybius' barbarian category in relation to his representations of the Romans provides a key to the historian's stance(s) on Rome, and here his speeches are of the utmost importance. The objectives of the present study are to analyze Polybius' "barbarology" vis-à-vis Rome, with a special focus on the medium of the reported speech, and to explore its implications regarding the political predicament of Greek statesmen of the second century in the face of Roman power.

In only one passage in the *Histories* (12.4b.2–3, discussed in Section II below), does the Achaean historian say in his own voice that the Romans were a barbarian people. Yet in three reported speeches, Polybius allows his historical agents Agelaus, Lyciscus, and a Greek ambassador, probably the Rhodian statesman Thrasycrates, to call the Romans "barbarians."<sup>2</sup> Without discounting the historicity of these ambassadors' charges against the Romans, I shall argue that Polybius employs these speeches as a vehicle for indirect expression of hostility towards Rome, a hostility conforming to widespread Greek public opinion at the time of composition of the *Histories*.<sup>3</sup> I refer to this Greek view of the Romans as βάρβαροι, according to

1. E.g., Walbank 1972, 166–83, *id.* 1977, esp. 155–62, and *id.* 1985, 280–97 (increasingly pro-Roman); Shimron 1979/80 (essentially anti-Roman); cf. Walbank 1985, 160: "Is he in fact for or against Rome in the final decision? The answer is not easy." Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the classics communities at Bryn Mawr College, the University of Colorado at Boulder, and the University of Chicago. I thank those audiences, as well as Arthur Eckstein, Jonathan Hall, and the referees of the journal, for helpful criticism. I also wish to thank Jochen Tuele in Princeton and Alfred Breiting in Aschaffenburg for bibliographic assistance. Any remaining faults are, of course, my own. Unless otherwise indicated, all dates are B.C.E. I have used Büttner-Wobst's Teubner edition (1889–1904); translated passages of Polybius are from W. R. Paton's Loeb text ([1922–27] 1979).

2. Polyb. 5.104.1–11 (Agelaus); 9.32.3–39.7 (Lyciscus); 11.4.1–6.8 ([Thrasycrates]). MS F<sup>2</sup> gives the name Thrasycrates as a marginal gloss: Walbank 1967, 16; see n. 33 below.

3. Cf. Polyb. 39.3.8–9: nearly all Greeks ill-disposed to Rome in winter 192/1, on the eve of the First Romano-Syrian War. For an overview of Greek views on Rome, see Forte 1972. On anti-Roman motivations in Greek authors, see Castiglioni 1928; Fuchs [1938] 1964; Deininger 1971, 3–5 and nn. 3–18; Gabba 1974; Taifacos 1982.

which the Romans emerge as an uncivilized and savage people, as a politics of cultural alienation; that is, we have a politically-charged Greek representation of the Romans as an utterly strange and different cultural group.<sup>4</sup>

On the other hand, Greeks in the first half of the second century often approached the Romans with conciliatory gestures. Greeks could hail Romans as common benefactors and as “honorary Greeks”; we might call this Greek stance towards Rome a politics of cultural assimilation. As we shall see, there is clear evidence for this approach in Polybius’ work, yet this in no way disproves the politics of cultural alienation for Polybian Romans as barbarians. Rather, a contextualist reading of Polybius’ narrative with emphasis on the time and circumstances of composition of the *Histories*, as well as on Polybius’ intended readership, makes sense of the seeming contradiction in these two rival pictures of Romans. These incongruous representations constitute a politics of cultural indeterminacy.

It must be said that the idea that Polybius employed speeches in order to express criticism of Rome is not new. F. A. Brandstaeter made this suggestion in his 1844 study of Aetolia; in 1857 Paul La Roche voiced the same idea; and in 1949 Elpidio Mioni briefly argued along similar lines. All of these scholars offered this interpretation only in passing; to the best of my knowledge, the idea has lain dormant ever since. Walbank notes both Brandstaeter’s and La Roche’s political reading of Romans as βάρβαροι in his *Commentary*, but he dismisses the idea without argumentation. Reappraisal of the question is warranted.<sup>5</sup>

Section One briefly lays out evidence for Greek politics of cultural assimilation and alienation in relations with Rome before Polybius composed his *Histories*. The topic, of course, is a large one; a detailed investigation would require a separate study. It is sufficient for my purposes to establish that Greek views on Rome were very divided in Polybius’ day and that the historian was working within a Greek ideological tradition that could represent Romans either as “honorary Greeks” or as barbarians.

Section Two analyzes a startling instance of an assimilationist representation of the Romans in the *Histories* (2.35), as well as Polybius’ depiction of a Roman military encounter with barbarians in which Romans exercise Hellenic λογισμός against barbarian θυμός (2.30). The analyses of these passages as examples of a cultural assimilation of Romans to Hellenism serve as preliminary points of contrast to the study of the one passage in which Polybius ranks the Romans as barbarians in his own voice and these three ambassadorial speeches in which Romans appear as barbarians. Con-

4. Cf. Plin. *HN* 29.14: Cato the Censor stated that Greek physicians took oaths to kill the Roman “barbarians” (*iurarunt inter se barbaros necare omnes medicina*). We need not accept the historicity of the statement, but it does provide evidence for Roman perceptions of Greek sentiment; see Gruen 1992, 78. For further Roman reflection of the Greek view of the Romans as barbarians in the second century, see Plaut. *Asin.* 11, *Capt.* 492, 884, *Mil.* 211, *Mostell.* 828, with Gruen 1984, p. 263 and n. 79.

5. Brandstaeter 1844, 250; La Roche 1857, 68; Mioni 1949, p. 115, n. 4, cf. pp. 24, 85. Walbank (1967, 176 ad 9.37.6, and 1985, 152–53), in agreement with Schmitt (1957/58, 5–11), maintains that Polybius did not regard the Romans as barbarians; cf. Dubuisson 1985, 284–85, arguing that Polybius’ long familiarity with Romans precluded him from calling them βάρβαροι.

sideration of the semantic registers of Polybius' uses of the word βάρβαρος shows its primarily negative connotations.

Section Three offers a context for the Polybian image of the Romans as barbarians through examination of the likely time of composition of these passages, some key political and military interactions and diplomatic exchanges between Rome and the Achaean Confederation during Polybius' lifetime, and consideration of Polybius' intended audiences. This part of the analysis furnishes suitable motivational contexts for Polybius' desire to indicate the cultural ambiguity of the Romans.

### I. GREEK CULTURAL POLITICS OF ASSIMILATION AND ALIENATION AND ROME

As early as the mid-fourth century, Plato's pupil Heraclides of Pontica referred to Rome as a Greek city.<sup>6</sup> Timaeus, writing c. 280, incorporated Rome into the Hellenic-Homeric tradition when he maintained that the Romans were descendants of the Trojans (Polyb. 12.4b, discussed below in Section II). In the 230s Rome intervened with the Aetolian Confederation on behalf of the Acarnanians. This diplomatic interchange is of interest for the politics of cultural assimilation because Strabo reports that the Acarnanians claimed that they had not participated in the Trojan expedition in order to win Roman support. In so doing the Acarnanians, like Timaeus, incorporated the Romans into the venerable Homeric tradition, and we may add that, like Heraclides, they acknowledged the civilized nature of the Romans, as the Trojans after all were refugees from a city.<sup>7</sup> Even the Macedonian king Philip V, who in 215/14 was at war with Rome, advised the Thessalian city of Larissa to follow the liberal policy of the Romans concerning the enfranchisement of citizens: further evidence for a Greek view of Rome as an orderly and rational community.<sup>8</sup> Clearly, then, Greeks were willing to think of Romans as part of the civilized world insofar as they lived in an impressively organized city. But Greek attitudes towards Rome in the late third and second centuries were for the most part instrumental: when Romans acted in Greek interests, as in the case of the Acarnanians, Greeks engaged what I have called a politics of cultural assimilation, treating Romans as "honorary Greeks"; when they acted in brutal fashion in Greek lands, the Romans became βάρβαροι through a Greek politics of cultural alienation.

Polybius' account of the First Illyrian War illustrates the first approach. Illyrian piracy in the Adriatic reached alarming proportions by c. 230. The Ardean queen-regent Teuta was unable to provide the Romans with assurances that she could control the marauding activities of the independent Illyrian tribesmen.<sup>9</sup> In 229/8, Rome's first military action across the Adriatic

6. Plut. *Cam.* 22.2: πόλιν Ἑλληνίδα Ῥώμην, with Gruen 1992, 10.

7. Just. *Epit.* 28.1.5–2.14; Strabo 10.2.25 (C 462); cf. Polyb. 22.5.3 (Ilium and Rome in the aftermath of the Roman victory over Antiochus III); and the catalogue of early Greek-Roman interactions at Eisen 1966, 9–11; Golan 1971 on Greek perceptions of Rome before 229. On kinship diplomacy, see now Jones 1999.

8. *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 543 (4).26–39; cf. Eratosth. ap. Strabo 1.4.9 (C 66): Romans and Carthaginians might be considered civilized because of their political institutions and urban lifestyles.

9. Polyb. 2.8.8–9; Dell 1967, 97–98, 101; cf. Champion 1997, 119–20.

came in response to Teuta's rebuff of a Roman commission. Illyrian resistance quickly crumbled under Rome's superior forces, and Teuta accepted terms in the spring of 228.<sup>10</sup> Polybius states that the Roman commander L. Postumius Albinus sent legates to Achaea and Aetolia explaining the reasons for Roman involvement across the Adriatic and relaying the terms of the treaty. The Senate dispatched other envoys to Athens and to Corinth, where the Corinthians admitted the Romans as "honorary Greeks" to the Isthmian Games.<sup>11</sup> Polybius remarks that in defeating the Illyrians, the Romans had delivered the Greeks from fears of the common enemy of humankind.<sup>12</sup>

Increasing Greek familiarity with Roman war making from the time of the First Macedonian War and the later phases of the Hannibalic War, both in Greece and in Sicily, led to a different Greek view of Rome. Reports of Roman behavior from the western Greeks in the last decade of the third century perhaps constituted much of what mainland Greeks knew of Rome; those reports would have been alarming (cf. Livy 31.29.4–16). Rome's harsh actions at Syracuse and Tarentum, especially the massacres and destructive looting, alienated Greek opinion—and made Greeks think of typically barbarian behavior.<sup>13</sup>

Many Greeks will have had their first direct experience of the Romans in the First Macedonian War as a result of the Romano-Aetolian alliance of 212/11. Those perceptions will not have been favorable to Rome, and, as we shall see, Polybius provides evidence that many Greeks condemned the Aetolians for forming an alliance with the Roman barbarian. Macedonia's second war with Rome confirmed the brutality of Roman war making. Besides the usual sacked Greek cities, we have the story that Philip V was shocked at the brutality of Roman battle techniques. Yet he was equally astonished at the ordered arrangement of the Roman military camp; it surpassed belief that this could be the camp of barbarians.<sup>14</sup> Thus the Romans were in Greek eyes impressive, even by Hellenic standards, in their orga-

10. Polyb. 2.11.1–12.4; App. *Ill.* 7–8; Gruen 1984, 359–73 for an account of the events, and references to earlier works on the aftermath at p. 57, n. 17.

11. Polyb. 2.12.4–8 and *MRR* 1.228 on Postumius. For the Romans as "honorary Greeks" at the Isthmia, see Holleaux 1921, 129, Gelzer 1933, 132, Deininger 1971, p. 25, n. 12. Habicht 1997, 184–85, briefly considers Roman motivations.

12. Polyb. 2.12.6, cf. 21.41.1–3: Greek embassies bearing crowns to the consul Cn. Manlius Vulso at Ephesus in 189 for having delivered them from the lawless violence (ὑβρις, παρανομία) of the Galatian tribes. For Greek appeals to Romans as common benefactors, see, e.g., *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 630.17–18 (Amphictyonic decree of 182); *IG* 2<sup>2</sup>.1134.69 and 103; *FD* III. 2.70.46; Volkmann 1954, p. 467 and nn. 1–6, p. 468 and nn. 1–3; Erskine 1994 and 1997; Ferrary 1988, 124–32, and 1997; Habicht 1997, p. 279 and n. 48. For monuments in Greece of L. Mummius, destroyer of Corinth, see Paus. 5.10.5 and 24.4; *IVO* 278–81, 319–24. Some of the epigraphical evidence probably represents replacements of the Augustan age or later, according to Dittenberger and Purgold (*IVO*, 406, 446).

13. For harsh Roman war making in general, see Eckstein 1976, 131–42. For a detailed analysis of Marcellus' campaign in Sicily, Eckstein 1987a, 157–69, 345–49. For Marcellus' Syracusan spoils, Livy 25.40.1–3; Petrochilos 1974, 70; Eckstein 1987a, p. 163 and nn. 28–29; Ferrary 1988, 573–78; Gruen 1992, 94–103. For Tarentum, Livy 27.16.1–9 with Toynbee 1965, 2:28: "a horrifying picture of the customary behaviour of Roman troops when they took a city by storm"; cf. Nottmeyer 1995, 157–58.

14. Livy 31.34.8; Nissen 1863, 128, for the Polybian derivation. On Roman methodical brutality in warfare, cf. the sack of Carthago Nova in 209 at Polyb. 10.15.4–5; Diod. 32.2.1, 4.5. Harris (1979, p. 52 and nn. 1–5, p. 53 and n. 1, and pp. 263–64) sees the Roman brutality well enough, but misses Polybius' point that the Romans are brutal in warfare, but also highly organized, in contradistinction to Greek practice. On this point, see now Eckstein 1997.

nizational capacities; yet they also were barbarous in the brutality of their conduct of war. Direct Greek experience with Rome in this period therefore informed the two Greek responses to Rome canvassed in this section, the cultural politics of assimilation and of alienation.

## II. AUTHORIAL STRATEGIES AND THE ROMANS AS BAPBAPOI IN POLYBIAN SPEECHES

There is clear evidence in Polybius' text for both of the Greek politico-cultural approaches to the Romans outlined above. Polybius' narrative assimilates Greeks and Romans by emphasizing the importance of political and social institutions as prime determinants in the formation of collective characteristics. Since institutions are subject to historical change, it therefore follows from Polybius' political theory that a given people's group character may evolve for either good or ill over time. Polybius' biological model for the rise and fall of states and his ἀνακύκλωσις theory in Book 6 presuppose natural laws of social psychology arising from a universal human nature. Furthermore, Polybius begins his analysis of the Roman *politeia* with an account of simple constitutional development based on Greek political theory. In short, Rome appears as some sort of extraordinary Greek polis.<sup>15</sup>

Indeed, even at the level of lexical analysis, Polybius practices an assimilation of Romans to Hellenism, as the historian, who knew some Latin and whose long sojourn in Rome left imprints of Latin interference in his phraseology, routinely prefers to give Greek equivalences of Roman institutions and social practices, rather than transliterations of Roman terms.<sup>16</sup> Polybius' use of the phrase ἡ καθ' ἡμᾶς θάλαττα (3.37.6, 4.42.3–4, 16.29.6) is suggestive in this context; the inclusionary “we” may refer to both the historian's Greek and Roman readerships.<sup>17</sup> Another sort of assimilationalist narrative strategy lies in the insertion of a brief history of the Achaean Confederation, the so-called Achaean προκατασκευή, in the otherwise Roman Book 2.<sup>18</sup> It is in the transition from Roman to Greek affairs in this book that we find a highly significant example of Polybian assimilation of Romans to Hellenism.

Polybius' Achaean προκατασκευή forms part of an historical account of the Achaean Confederation running parallel to his historical narrative of Rome in Books 1–5; in these books, we see both the Achaean and Roman polities in their optimal state.<sup>19</sup> Polybius concludes his account of the Romano-Gallic wars of the third century, culminating in the overwhelming Roman victory at Telamon in 225, with some generalized reflections on the triumph of Hellenic rationality or λογισμός over barbarian mindlessness,

15. Walbank 1972, 130–56; Eckstein 1997; Hahn 1995, with comprehensive bibliography on Book 6.

16. Dubuisson 1985, 113–14, and esp. 149–50, 216–17, and 258–70 for Polybius' familiarity with Latin. A large number of Polybius' latinisms occur in technical descriptions of Roman military matters.

17. I see no basis in Polybius' text for the claim of Dubuisson 1985, 214: “Quant à ἡ καθ' ἡμᾶς θάλαττα, ce n'est pas sa forme, mais son contenu qui est anormal: en dernière analyse, ἡμεῖς n'y désigne plus les Grecs, mais bien les Romains.”

18. Polyb. 2.37–71, with Gelzer 1940a and 1940b. Petzold (1969, 25–128) emphasizes differences between Rome and Achaea in Polybius' thought: Rome's rise was based on military power; Achaea's on ethical principles. The emphasis here is on similarities; i.e., Roman “Hellenic” qualities; cf. n. 45 below.

19. Champion 1993, 20–123, esp. 111–22.

recklessness, and ill-planned campaigns (ἀκρισία, θυμός, παράλογοι ἔφοδοι, 2.35.3–6). This passage serves as a transition to the account of Achaëa's rise. Here the Roman victories over the Gauls stand alongside famous feats in the Greeks' history, the victory in the Persian Wars of the fifth century and the defense of the Delphic sanctuary against a Gallic incursion in 279, and they serve as paradigmatic examples of Hellenic rationality triumphing over barbarian irrationality against overwhelming odds. The Romans in this chapter are "honorary Greeks"; it is a remarkable historiographical piece of evidence for a Greek politics of cultural assimilation.<sup>20</sup>

If rationality or λογισμός is the key characteristic of Hellenic virtue in Polybius, then we can see that the barbarian, by way of contrast, frequently points out the Hellenism of the Romans in Polybius' work. The account of the decisive battle between Romans and Gauls at Telamon in 225 precedes the reflective passage at 2.35; it presents the differences between the opposing forces of Romano-Hellenic order and rationality and barbarian chaos and irrationality in action. In recounting the movements before the battle, Polybius reveals that the Gauls were not bereft of tactical strategy, and he admits that their formation was well adapted to their predicament, trapped between two consular armies (2.28.6–7, cf. 29.5: Celtic κόσμος). Yet once the battle begins, the barbarian stereotype comes into full play. According to Polybius, the Romans possessed a decided advantage from the start in the superiority of their military equipment (2.30.7–8). The battle opened with the Roman *iaculatores* or javelineers hurling their spears in compact, effective volleys against the ineffectual shields and naked bodies of the front ranks of the Gauls. The barbarians were soon in a state of confusion and perplexity; some rushed upon the Roman troops in an impotent, irrational, self-destructive rage (ὕπὸ τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀλογιστίας, 30.4). As a counterweight to the Gallic rage and desperate fury, we learn that the Roman consul and army exhibited self-possession in sending the spoils back to Rome and returning the booty of the barbarian to its rightful owners (31.1–4).<sup>21</sup>

In such Polybian passages, then, the Romans emerge as practitioners of Hellenic λογισμός; according to a politics of cultural assimilation, we may say that they act as "honorary Greeks." The images of Romans in the ambassadorial speeches of Agelaus, Lyciscus, and [Thrasycrates] are a polar opposite to Polybius' assimilationist representation of Romans at 2.35 and in the account of the Gallic *tumultus*. There can be no doubt as to the pejorative force of the references to Romans as barbarians in these speeches. In ancient Greek thought, of course, the Hellenic-barbarian dichotomy was a bipolar politico-cultural construct that served to foist undesirable characteristics, such as sloth, irresolution, greed, irrationality, and uncontrolled violence,

20. Champion 1996, 324–28.

21. Walbank 1957, 204–7. For Romano-Gallic interaction in this period, Eckstein 1987a, 3–23, and *id.* 1995, 122–24, on Polybius' depiction of barbarous Celtic practices and irrationality. Other dramatic Polybian examples of Roman λογισμός vs. barbarian θυμός include 11.31.1–33.6, where Scipio outmaneuvers the barbarous, brave, but disorganized Ilergetes, and 33.10, where Opimius' highly organized and disciplined army defeats the wild and uncoordinated Ligurian Oxybii and Deciates, who had begun this war with outrages against Roman envoys and violation of the *ius gentium*. Clearly this theme was attractive to Polybius.

upon the non-Greek Other. The term βάρβαρος was essentially a negative term that could only take on meaning when opposed to Hellenism; it conventionally became a sort of short-hand way of pointing out the absence of temperance, moderation, balance, and reason, the hallmarks of the Hellenic, civilized society.<sup>22</sup>

Polybius follows this conventional practice in his uses of the word βάρβαρος and its cognates. In his thought, barbarians, along with mercenaries, the masses, youth, and women, pose a threat to the social order. Eckstein has suggested that in Polybius these threats form several concentric circles from beyond the borders of the civilized Mediterranean world to within the Greek aristocratic household itself. The outermost circle consists in the barbarian; the innermost is comprised of the women of the most secluded section of the Greek household, the “women’s quarters,” or γυναικεία. Lack of self-control, impulsive, violent behavior, and unbridled passion run throughout these circles. All of these menacing groups lack the fully developed rational faculty, and these categories, as in the case of the Illyrian queen-regent Teuta, sometimes overlap in the *Histories*, overdetermining the irrational threat to the orderly society. The individual leadership skills of the adult male aristocracy, in Polybius’ view, are the only bulwark against these irrational forces. For Polybius, reasoning power or λογισμός was the weapon to combat them, and the historian worried that not enough males of the ruling elite actually possessed the required characteristics.<sup>23</sup> In Polybius’ work, contemporary Greeks frequently exhibit negative traits the historian usually attributes to barbarians; indeed, in one passage Polybius states that it would be difficult to find such mindlessness and general lack of judgment among barbarians as the Achaeans exhibited at the time of the so-called Achaean War.<sup>24</sup> Such allegations against Greeks are consistent with Polybius’ political theory, which, as noted above, sees collective social characteristics as being historically contingent upon the health of institutional structures and customary practices.

In this context it would be very significant if Polybius never used the term βάρβαροι of the Romans. It is equally significant that scholars have mistakenly maintained that he did not. In an important passage from the methodological Book 12, which has not received the careful attention it deserves, Polybius calls the Romans βάρβαροι in his own voice. Here, he is discussing the errors of the Sicilian Greek historian, Timaeus. Polybius has been chastising Timaeus for his petty and unjust charges against Theopompus and Ephorus, and he proceeds to list a series of Timaeus’ own blunders. First among these is Timaeus’ discussion of the “October Horse” ceremony at Rome. In his account of King Pyrrhus, Timaeus stated that the Romans

22. For the typology, see Hall 1989, Cartledge 1993, *passim*; for exhaustive treatment of the barbarian category in Roman thought, see Dauge 1981.

23. Eckstein 1995, 118–60, esp. 119–25 on barbarians, and 158–60, 285–89 for Polybius’ concerns about the impact of moral failings on the Greek elite. For the Roman imposition of order in the outermost of the concentric circles, the οἰκουμένη, see Polyb. 3.3.5.

24. 38.18.7–8. For a catalogue of Polybius’ negative assessments of Hellenistic Greek states in the military sphere, see Eckstein 1997, 176–78.

sacrificed a horse in the Campus Martius on an appointed day each year in order to commemorate their disaster at Troy, because the famous wooden horse had led to the sack of Rome's ancestral city. Polybius calls this a most childish statement (πρᾶγμα πάντων παιδαριωδέστατον). In making his point against Timaeus, Polybius argues that the Roman practice is a common custom among almost all the barbarians (πάντας τοὺς βαρβάρους).<sup>25</sup> He says that, if we were to follow Timaeus, then all barbarians must be descendants of the Trojans, since practically all of them sacrifice a horse on the eve of battle, divining the future from the way the animal falls. In 12.4c.1, Polybius charges Timaeus with both lack of experience (ἄπειρίαν) and superficial learning (ὀψιμαθίαν) in connecting the sacrifice of a horse at Rome to the Roman myth of Trojan origins. Within the framework of our discussion, we may note that in asserting the Roman connection to Troy Timaeus was dealing with a Greek politics of cultural assimilation of the Romans to Hellenism—a politics that Polybius here explicitly denies. In this instance, Polybius takes exception to both Timaeus' linking of Rome to the Homeric tradition and his implication that the original Romans were refugees from the civilized city of Troy. Greater learning and diligence, Polybius maintains, would have led Timaeus to realize that the answer was much simpler: horse sacrifice is nearly universal among βάρβαροι. Romans, as barbarians, act according to a widespread barbarian custom. If Timaeus had realized this, he would not have relayed the silly story of the Trojan horse in this context.<sup>26</sup>

In the historical narrative proper, there is some other indirect evidence for Romans as barbarians in Polybius' eyes. At 1.11.7 Polybius states that King Hieron II of Syracuse saw an opportunity of expelling the "barbarians" occupying Messana. The statement is vague, but it is just possible that both Romans and Mamertines represent the βάρβαροι. In any case, the Mamertines are certainly barbarians here, and in 1.10.2 Polybius says that the Mamertines were kinsmen of the Romans, ὁμόφυλοι.<sup>27</sup> In the account of the First Romano-Carthaginian War, Polybius remarks that the Romans use force (βία) in all endeavors. When they obstinately attempt to apply βία against the forces of nature, they act in opposition to λόγος, which is of course a characteristic fault of barbarians.<sup>28</sup> The same suggestion arises in Cicero's statement that Polybius criticized the Romans for their neglect of formal παιδεία, a quintessential mark of Hellenic culture.<sup>29</sup>

25. Walbank (1967, 328 ad loc. ["not including the Romans, whom P. never calls barbarians except in reported speeches"]) misses Polybius' obvious point. For Polybius' sustained polemic against Timaeus, see Meister 1975, 3–55, Sacks 1981, 21–95.

26. This is the only possible interpretation of this passage according to which Polybius offers his own account for the Roman "October Horse" ceremony. Any reading denying that Polybius is here calling the Romans barbarians must assume that in his impassioned attack on Timaeus, Polybius, for whom αἰτίαι are so crucial (locus classicus 3.6.1–7.7, with Pédech 1964, 54–98, Walbank 1972, 157–60, Mohm 1977, 151–57), forgot to provide his own causal explanation for horse sacrifice at Rome.

27. Contra Lazenby (1996, 47), who believes that 1.11.7 refers only to the Mamertines; for our purposes, the point remains the same; i.e., the Romans are ὁμόφυλοι of barbarians.

28. 1.37.7; cf. Wiedemann 1990, 298, on Polybius' representation of Hannibal: "Polybius seems to be indicating that he is uncertain whether Hannibal is civilised or barbarous; it is unclear whether he tries to control his audience through *logos* or through *bia*." For a less pejorative interpretation of 1.37.7, see Eckstein 1997, 178–79.

29. Cic. *Rep.* 4.3.3 with MacMullen 1991, p. 434 and n. 53.



These passages (which scholars have not collected together before) suggest a Polybian image of Romans as barbarians, but even cumulatively they do not constitute in themselves compelling evidence for a Polybian politics of cultural alienation from Rome. I argue, however, that the historian further engages in this cultural politics, if only indirectly, through the medium of the reported speech. It is in the context of this Greek politico-cultural stance vis-à-vis Rome that we must view the Polybian speeches of Agelaus, Lyciscus, and [Thrasycrates].

At the end of Book 5, Polybius highlights the speech of the Aetolian ambassador Agelaus at the peace conference at Naupactus in 217, the dramatic setting for the introduction of the historian's συμπλοκή, the historical moment at which the events of the Mediterranean world became an interconnected whole.<sup>30</sup> At this crucial historical juncture in the *Histories* the Romans appear as barbarians (5.104.1–2):

ὃς ἔφη δεῖν μάλιστα μὲν μηδέποτε πολεμεῖν τοὺς Ἑλληνας ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλὰ μεγάλην χάριν ἔχειν τοῖς θεοῖς, εἰ λέγοντες ἔν καὶ ταῦτὸ πάντες καὶ συμπλέκοντες τὰς χεῖρας, καθάπερ οἱ τοὺς ποταμοὺς διαβαίνοντες, δύναιτο τὰς τῶν βαρβάρων ἐφόδους ἀποτριβόμενοι συσφῶζειν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰς πόλεις.

It would be best of all if the Greeks never made war on each other, but regarded it as the highest favor in the gift of the gods could they always speak with one heart and voice, and marching arm in arm like men fording a river, repel barbarian invaders and unite in preserving themselves and their cities.

Agelaus goes on to state that the ultimate victor in the war raging between Rome and Carthage would be sure to invade Greece, transgressing the bounds of justice (5.104.3–4). The Aetolian ambassador ends his speech with what is perhaps the most memorable passage in the *Histories*, referring to the western powers as “clouds that loom in the west to settle on Greece” (104.10). In Agelaus’ representation, the Romans are therefore a barbarian people who do not know justice, threatening Greece as some ominous cloud from the west.<sup>31</sup>

In late spring 210 Philip V and the Aetolians again were at war. Macedonian and Aetolian representatives went to neutral Greek states in order to strike up alliances. Aetolia had already formed an alliance with Rome.<sup>32</sup> In Book 9, Polybius records a pair of speeches; one from the Macedonian side, the other from the Aetolian camp, delivered at Sparta. Lyciscus, an Acarnanian ambassador, appeals to the Spartans on Macedonia’s behalf. The bulk of his speech emphasizes the great services the Macedonians had performed for the rest of the Greek world in fighting off the barbarians to

30. On the συμπλοκή, see Mohm 1977, 68–76, Walbank 1985, 313–24, and Champion 1997, 112–17.

31. See Deininger 1971, 25–29. The speech reveals much of Polybius’ historiographical practice in recording speeches. For summary and extension of recent debates, see Champion 1997; on Polybian speeches generally, Sacks 1981, 79–95; Walbank 1985, 242–61.

32. Livy 26.24.8–16, cf. Polyb. 18.38.7–9 (Flamininus); Deininger 1971, 29–31. For exhaustive discussion of the Laevinus treaty and the inscription from Thyrrhion (*SEG* 13, 382 = *JG* 9 1<sup>2</sup>, 1, 241 = *SVA* 3, 536), see Lehmann 1967, 51–134; cf. Dahlheim 1968, 181–207, Gruen 1984, p. 18, n. 20.

the north. In reference to the Romano-Aetolian alliance, he chastises the Aetolians (9.37.5–6): τίσι δὲ νῦν κοινωνεῖτε τῶν ἐλπίδων, ἢ πρὸς ποίαν παρακαλεῖτε τοὺς συμμαχίαν; ἄρ' οὐ πρὸς τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων; (“[W]ho made common cause with you at present or what kind of an alliance do you invite them to enter? Is it not an alliance with barbarians?”) The Acarnanian stresses the danger posed by Rome, warning that Greece is now threatened by a foreign race whose intention is to enslave the Hellenes. Lyciscus repeats Agelaus’ famous metaphor of Rome as an ominous cloud from the west (37.10), and he chides the Spartans for entertaining the idea of an alliance with barbarians against Greece (38.5). Near his speech’s end, Lyciscus calls to mind the image of the women of Anticyra being carried off by the Romans to suffer what must be suffered by those who fall into the power of aliens (39.3). As Agelaus had done indirectly in his speech at Naupactus, Lyciscus in Polybius’ text thus represents the Romans as an unjust, barbarous, and violent people bent on enslaving Greeks.

In 207 a Greek embassy, with participants from Egypt, Chios, Mytilene, and King Amyntander of Athamania, addressed the Aetolian Confederation. Its task was to convince the Aetolians to come to terms with Macedonia and end the war still raging throughout Greece. A statesman named Thrasycrates appears to have been a Rhodian representative at the conference. Polybius probably reproduces Thrasycrates’ speech in Book 11; the identification is not absolutely certain.<sup>33</sup> This speaker echoes Lyciscus’ criticism at Sparta of the Romano-Aetolian alliance:

πολεμεῖτε δ’ ἐπ’ ἐξανδραποδισμῷ καὶ καταφθορᾷ τῆς Ἑλλάδος. ταῦτα γὰρ αἱ συνθήκαι λέγουσιν ὑμῶν αἱ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους . . . καὶ κυριεύσαντες μὲν αὐτοὶ πόλεως οὗτ’ ἂν ὑβρίζειν ὑπομείναιτε τοὺς ἐλευθέρους οὗτ’ ἐμπιπράναι τὰς πόλεις, νομίζοντες ὡμὸν εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτο καὶ βαρβαρικόν· συνθήκας δὲ πεποίηθε τοιαύτας, δι’ ὧν ἅπαντας τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλλήνας ἐκδότους δεδώκατε τοῖς βαρβάροις εἰς τὰς αἰσχίστας ὑβρεῖς καὶ παρανομίας.

[Y]ou are fighting for the enslavement and ruin of Greece. This is the story your treaty with the Romans tells. . . . Did you capture a city yourselves you would not allow yourselves to outrage freemen or to burn their towns, which you regard as a cruel proceeding and barbarous; but you have made a treaty by which you have given up to the barbarians the rest of the Greeks to be exposed to atrocious outrage and violence.<sup>34</sup>

The envoy goes on to warn that the Romans will throw themselves into Greece with main force with the intention of conquering the entire land (11.6.1–2). The pattern is clear: in three Greek ambassadorial speeches spanning a decade, Polybius represents Romans as uncouth and unprincipled bar-

33. Walbank 1967, 274–75 ad 11.4.1–6.10; cf. Pédech 1964, 268, Deininger 1971, 32–34.

34. Polyb. 11.5.1–2, 6–8; cf. 24.13.4–5, where Philopoemen refers to the Capuans and Sicilian Greeks as slaves of Rome. For echoes of the three ambassadors’ allegations about Roman intentions, see 10.25.1–5, where the Romans are foreigners taking advantage of Greeks, with Holleaux 1921, p. 35, n. 4, p. 238, n. 2; this fragment of a speech probably comes from the debate at Aegion in 209 mentioned at Livy 27.30.9–10; Walbank 1967, 15, 229. Livy (P) 39.37.9–10 (184): Lycortas, Polybius’ father, refers to the Achaean relation to Rome as in danger of becoming that of slave to master; Nissen 1863, 224, on the Polybian derivation; Livy (P) 31.29.8–9 (199): a Macedonian orator contrasts the freedom of Aetolian assemblies with Sicilian meetings held in the presence of a Roman praetor.

barians who will destroy Greek liberty. In Agelaus' prooemium, the general reference to the perils of barbarian invasions introduces the idea of the imminent danger of invasion of Greece by the victor in the Second Romano-Carthaginian War; and both Lyciscus' and [Thrasycrates'] speeches explicitly refer to Romans as βάρβαροι. In addition to these formal and highly dramatic speeches, we also have the brief report in direct speech of Macedonian reconnaissance scouts in 197 at the decisive moment in the battle at Cynoscephalae in which, according to Polybius, Philip's scouts repeatedly referred to the movements of the Roman βάρβαροι.<sup>35</sup> Scholars previously have ignored this passage in discussions of Polybius' views on Rome.

In a passage derived from Polybius, Livy preserves yet another example of Romans as barbarians in Polybian speeches.<sup>36</sup> In spring 199 a Macedonian ambassador spoke at the *Panaetolica*, urging the Aetolians to remain at peace with Philip V during his impending struggle against Rome. The ambassador states that the mainland Greeks could expect the same brutally imperious treatment from Romans as the Greeks of Italy and Sicily had experienced. The Romans are an alien race, the speaker alleges, sharply separated from Greeks by language, customs, and laws.<sup>37</sup> He goes on to warn of the dangers of reintroducing foreign troops (*legiones externas*) into Greece, and he concludes with a categorical statement on the perennial and natural enmity existing between Greeks and barbarians: "cum alienigenis, cum barbaris aeternum omnibus Graecis bellum est eritque; natura enim, quae perpetua est, non mutabilibus in diem causis hostes sunt" (Livy 31.29.15–16). Pro-Roman Athenian envoys give a stinging riposte to the Macedonian ambassador's charge of the Romans as βάρβαροι, turning the tables in calling the impious Philip V the real barbarian (Livy 31.30.4). These speeches underscore the intensity of the divided nature of Greek opinions on Rome in the early second century. In another Livian speech derived from Polybius, in 195 the Aetolian ambassador Alexander rebuked the Athenians, glorious freedom fighters against the barbarian in their past, who were now Roman lackeys, all too willing to support a foreign ruler.<sup>38</sup> It is safe to assume that Livy here reproduces an image of the Romans he found in Polybian speeches; he is unlikely to have invented the anti-Roman sentiments himself. From this time, the beginning of the second century, the sources are silent on formal Greek diplomatic references to the Romans as barbarians, but, as I suggest in my final section, there is no reason to believe that that perception had faded among Greek politicians in the decades that intervened between these anti-Roman Greek orations and Polybius' recording of them.<sup>39</sup> Polybius' authorial decision to record anti-Roman sentiments in such detail is significant.

35. Polyb. 18.22.8; cf. Plut. *Flam.* 5.5 (Macedonian reports of the Roman βάρβαροι).

36. Livy 31.29.4–16; Nissen 1863, 126–27, on the Polybian derivation; Walbank 1940, 138–85, Gruen 1984, 382–98, and Errington 1989, 261–74, on the events of the Second Macedonian War.

37. Livy 31.29.12: *alienigenae homines, plus lingua et moribus et legibus quam maris terrarumque spatio discreti*.

38. Livy 34.23.5–11, with Habicht 1997, 206–7.

39. Deininger 1971, 34–37, on the disappearance during the Second Macedonian War in official Greek political propaganda of Panhellenic appeals to a common defense against the Romans as βάρβαροι.

As we have seen, except for one passage, which scholars have previously misinterpreted, Polybius makes the charge that Romans were barbarians indirectly, usually through the medium of the reported speech of historical characters. There is no reason to discount the historicity of the Greek antipathy against Romans in these speeches. Polybius has deservedly enjoyed a reputation through the centuries as a painstaking and scrupulous researcher for whom truth (ἀλήθεια) is the paramount concern.<sup>40</sup> In these speeches Polybius most certainly is relaying orally transmitted reports of actual Greek charges against Romans, and therefore we should view them as historical evidence for a Greek politics of cultural alienation from Rome. Yet, since they derived from a predominantly oral culture, such speeches necessarily required the historian to reconstitute them through his own memory, reports from eyewitnesses, or even his own knowledge of the political context of the speech, as written transcripts of speeches were rare. Verbatim reproduction of historical agents' speeches most frequently would be an impossibility, and the historian perforce exercised a certain amount of invention in reproducing speeches. This situation would have been especially true in the case of battle exhortations of field commanders to their troops.<sup>41</sup> Polybius himself provides an illustration of this point. He states that Achaean soldiers could not hear what Philopoemen had to say before the battle against Machanidas at Mantinea, yet the historian gives the "gist," just the same.<sup>42</sup> Another illustration, more significant for our discussion, is 18.22.8, where we have the Macedonian reports in direct speech on the Roman barbarians' position in the midst of the battle at Cynoscephalae.

Polybius' historiographical practice in recording speeches, then, of necessity leads the historian not only to select exclusively what he believes to be the most historically significant portions of a given speech, but also to shape the material of an historical agent's speech according to his own understanding of the events.<sup>43</sup> These references to Romans as βάρβαροι were most likely integral, passionately felt parts of these Greek orations. Yet, as Walbank has also suggested, anything that we find in Polybian speeches is the result of the author's "subjective operations."<sup>44</sup> And the inclusion of references to Romans as barbarians seems to run counter to some modern scholars' position that Polybius minimizes the differences between Greeks and Romans; we may view these passages as prime evidence for the historian's honesty and integrity.<sup>45</sup> In the case of the passages under consideration, we may point to the famous cloud metaphor, which Polybius attributes to Age-

40. On Polybius' rigorous historiographical principles and posthumous reputation, see assembled references at Champion 1996, pp. 315–16, nn. 2–4; on his use of oral testimony, see Pédech 1964, 356–77.

41. See Hansen 1993, Ehrhardt 1995.

42. Polyb. 11.12.1–3; it is indeed difficult to reconcile the evidence of this passage with Polybius' criticism of Timaeus' practice with historical agents' speeches at 12.25a.3–5.

43. See now Champion 1997, 112–17.

44. Walbank 1985, 249.

45. See now Eckstein 1997 for Polybius' stress on differences in institutions, rather than innate differences, between Greeks and Romans. I do not wish to contest this assimilationist aspect of Polybius' representation of Romans; indeed, we have already seen a remarkable example of it (Polyb. 2.35). Rather, I want to argue for complexity, ambiguity, and tension within Polybius' image of Romans. For scholarly opinion that Polybius emphasizes the differences between Greeks and Romans, see assembled references at Eckstein 1997, p. 175, n. 1; cf. p. 176, n. 4.

laus and then has Lyciscus repeat, as a demonstration of the historian's shaping of the material in his speeches.<sup>46</sup> We also may note that close to half a century had elapsed between the delivery of these speeches and Polybius' recording of them, for Polybius began composing his work sometime after his extradition to Italy in the aftermath of the battle at Pydna in summer 168.<sup>47</sup>

Polybius, then, has faithfully reported historical speeches with the degree of accuracy that his historiographical conventions allowed, but the conditions in which he worked entailed a good deal of what we should call authorial license. If Polybius' reports of the anti-Roman sentiments in recorded speeches show him to be a good historian, relaying what actually happened as he received it from his informants, his inclusion and shaping of this material also constituted an historiographical and a political choice. Polybius did not have to relate these speeches *in extenso*. In doing so he provided a platform for detailed Greek attacks against the Romans. In the following section I examine the historical background to the political dimension of these Polybian speeches, the detailed reporting of Greek charges of Roman barbarism, as a Polybian engagement of the politics of cultural alienation.

### III. ROMANS AS BARBARIANS AND ACHAEAN POLITICS

A contextualist reading of these anti-Roman speeches in Polybius accommodates the two diametrically opposed representations according to which Romans emerge both as "honorary Greeks" and as βάρβαροι. I shall first discuss the time of composition as it bears on this inquiry. Attempts to date particular parts of the *Histories* are fraught with difficulties.<sup>48</sup> The problem of later insertions, for example, runs throughout the work.<sup>49</sup> Yet such insertions predominantly concern Polybius' personal experiences,<sup>50</sup> whereas the orations under consideration took place before Polybius' birth. It is highly likely, on this evidence, that these speeches are integral parts of the original text of the books in which they occur. Now, Polybius makes several references to Carthage as still being in existence down to Book 15; the Romans destroyed Carthage, of course, in 146.<sup>51</sup> During his travels circa 151–46 Polybius most likely did not have time for extensive writing.<sup>52</sup> These observations yield a *terminus ante quem* for the composition of the speeches of Agelaus, Lyciscus, and [Thrasycrates], in Books 5, 9, and 11, respectively, of circa 151; indeed, considering their placement in the text, Polybius probably wrote them earlier in the 150s.

Polybius composed the books in which these speeches occur, therefore, while he was still technically a political prisoner at Rome. He wrote for

46. 5.104.10, 9.37.10. Polybius employs the cloud figure in his own voice at 38.16.3.

47. See Walbank 1972, 16–31.

48. Weil 1988 maintains that we can know almost nothing about the time of composition, an excessively pessimistic view.

49. See Walbank 1977, 140–45.

50. E.g., Demetrius I Soter's escape from Rome in 162 at 31.11.1–15.12, perhaps the most famous example.

51. 1.73.4, 6.52.1–3 and 56.1–3, 9.9.9–10, 14.10.5, 15.30.10; cf. 31.12.12. Erbse 1951 and 1957 argued that these are "achronistic" present tenses; rightly rejected by Brink and Walbank 1954, 99; Walbank 1963, 204–6; Musti 1965, 383–84; cf. Mioni 1949, 36–37. On the redaction generally, see Pédech 1964, 563–73.

52. See Pédech 1964, 532–34, 555–96.

both Roman and Greek audiences.<sup>53</sup> We have seen that he draws on an established Greek tradition of cultural assimilation of Romans to Hellenism, and cynics might say that Polybius' position as political prisoner makes it easy to understand his representations of "Hellenic" Romans: they were congenial to his Roman readership. But I have also suggested that Polybius indirectly engages another established Greek practice, a politics of cultural alienation from Rome. This Polybian image of Romans as barbarians is more mysterious. I suggest that allegations of Roman barbarism, as evidenced in these speeches, take on meaning in the context of Achaean political interactions with Rome and Polybius' stance as Achaean patriot regarding the Roman dominion.

In the collective historical conscience of the Achaean Confederation, discomfiture and embarrassment concerning Achaean relations with Rome reached back to 198. Achaea's relationship with the Macedonian monarchy lay at the root of these collective pangs of conscience, and Polybius and Livian passages derived from Polybius provide the bulk of the evidence for them. Many Achaean poleis owed debts of gratitude to Macedonia. In 210/9, the Achaeans and other Greeks had beseeched Philip V for aid against the depredations of Aetolians, Attalus I of Pergamum, and the Romans (Polyb. 10.41.1–2). In the early stages of the First Macedonian War, Philip had defended Sicyon and Corinth from Roman attacks.<sup>54</sup> During his second war against Rome, Philip actually returned cities to the κοινόν in order to ensure merely Achaea's benevolent neutrality in the coming struggle.<sup>55</sup>

Achaea suddenly severed its ties with Macedonia in autumn 198, joining Rome against Philip. Indeed, Polybius states that the Achaeans accomplished many of their most brilliant achievements in league with the Romans.<sup>56</sup> Yet some Achaean statesmen viewed the volte-face of 198 as a political betrayal, and there are indications in Polybius' account relating to this event that seem to belie the proud statement at 2.42.5.<sup>57</sup> No Achaean patriot could look back on the Achaean support for Rome resulting from the divisive Achaean meeting at Sicyon in 198 without some reservation. The στρατηγός Aristaenus pushed through the resolution to join Rome only with the greatest difficulty; a certain Memnon of Pellene broke the deadlock of the Achaean *damiurgi* to put the proposal to assist Rome before the Achaean assembly only after having been threatened with death by his father (Livy

53. Mioni 1949, 32. Walbank (1972, pp. 3–6 and nn. 16–19) assembles the references, stressing Polybius' Greek readership, to which add 1.42.1–2 (Sicily to Italy as Peloponnesus to Greece). But I cannot accept his dismissal of 31.22.8, where Polybius states that his work will be read above all by Romans; see Dubuisson 1985, 266–67.

54. Livy 27.31.1–3; cf. Polyb. 22.8.9–11: in 210 Galba stormed Achaean Aegina, sold all its inhabitants into slavery, and passed it on to the Aetolians, who in turn sold it to Attalus of Pergamum for thirty talents. Many Aeginetans were able to purchase their freedom, despite Galba's blustering (Polyb. 9.42.5–8).

55. Livy 32.5.4–5; cf. Polyb. 4.9.4; Livy 32.5.4 (Achaean oath of allegiance to Macedonia), with Aymard 1938b, 50–57. But see Errington 1989, 262–63, for consideration of Philip's tactlessness regarding Achaea before the outbreak of the war. On Macedonian and, later, Roman encumbrances on Achaean autonomy, see Aymard 1938a, 200–204; further discussion of close Macedonian/Achaean relations at Eckstein 1987b, 140–42.

56. Polyb. 2.42.5; on the subsequent formal Romano-Achaean treaty, probably of 192/91, see Badian 1952.

57. Cf. Polyb. 30.7.3–4 with Nottmeyer 1995, 94, for Polybius' sympathies for those who had remained loyal to King Perseus.

32.22.5–8). When it became clear that the assembly would vote for assistance to Rome, the representatives from Dyme, Argos, and Polybius' own hometown, Megalopolis, left the council rather than participate in the decision. The Argives shortly thereafter seceded from the Achaean κοινόν in declaring allegiance to Philip. According to Appian's account, the Achaean majority favored Philip's cause.<sup>58</sup> Later in the war Philip publicly accused the Achaeans of ingratitude; after all his benefactions they had betrayed him to his enemy.<sup>59</sup> The Achaean statesman Archon, with whom Polybius had close political connections, could look back on the decision of 198 from a quarter-century remove with regret, in light of Macedonian services to the Achaeans.<sup>60</sup>

Aristaenus was the foremost proponent in 198 for a reversal of traditional Achaean policy towards Macedonia. He apparently enjoyed close relations with Flamininus and, at least insofar as we can reconstruct the Polybian narrative of the lost Book 17 from Livy, Polybius represented Aristaenus himself as the source for the Roman commander Flamininus' policy of the "freedom of the Greeks."<sup>61</sup> And Polybius takes great pains to present Aristaenus and his policies in a most positive light. In his comparison of Aristaenus and Philopoemen (24.11.1–13.10), Polybius represents Aristaenus as a politically astute politician who knew that political realities forced Achaea to look to its own advantage (τὸ συμφέρον) when honor (τὸ καλόν) ceased to be a possibility. And indeed Achaea had benefited greatly from its association with Rome: regaining Corinth from Macedonia; recovering Argos; and being allowed to absorb Sparta and Messene. But in 24.11–13 the historian also praises the opposing policy of Philopoemen, who took a harder line, stressing the letter of the law in Achaean relations with Rome in order to stave off the inevitable Achaean subservience to the Romans for as long as possible. Polybius also took care to preserve Lycortas' hard-line speech against the Roman hegemony (Livy [P] 39.36.6–37.18), and he reviles the excessively pro-Roman Callicrates (Polyb. 24.8.1–10.15, 30.29.1–7).

The ambiguity in these passages is suggestive of the tensions that must have arisen concerning Polybius' own cautiously ambivalent policies towards Rome in 170–68. In autumn 170 Polybius, about to enter upon the office of ἵππαρχος, opposed his father Lycortas' neutrality with a more pro-Roman policy, and in his account the historian does not conceal the fact that Lycortas and many other Achaeans, political heirs of the policies of the

58. Livy 32.19.1–23.3, 24.1–7 (Elatea), 25.1–12 (Argos and Corinth); Achaean majority favors Macedonia: App. *Mac.* 7; cf. Paus. 7.8.2; extensive discussion of the Achaean assembly of 198 at Aymard 1938b, 79–102, at pp. 80–81, n. 49 of the date; concise treatments at Deininger 1971, 42–46; Gruen 1984, 444–46.

59. Polyb. 18.6.5–8; Livy 32.34.11–13; Aymard 1938b, pp. 53–54 and nn. 27–28; Eckstein 1990, pp. 68–69 and n. 74; cf. Livy 34.23.6–7 (Alexander the Aetolian in 195); Achaeans as *transfugas* from Philip who received Corinth and sought after Argos.

60. Livy 41.24.12–15; Polyb. 28.6.1–7.15 for Polybius and Archon.

61. See Livy 32.21.36 (*libertas*); for ἐλευθερία as a constant, underlying principle of Achaean policy in Polybius, see 2.37.9–11, 42.6–7, 43.8–9 (Aratus), 58.1–3 (Mantineia), 69.1–2 (Sellasia). Aristaenus himself probably stressed the Achaean principle of freedom, as suggested by his dedication to Flamininus at Corinth: SEG 22, no. 214 (1967), with Eckstein 1990, 62–63. See Ferrary 1988, 83–88 for a brief account of the Greek diplomatic antecedents of Flamininus' ἐλευθερία theme.

Achaean hero Philopoemen, took a dim view of any unnecessary collaboration with the Romans.<sup>62</sup> Upon entering office, Polybius supported the restoration of Achaean honors to the pro-Roman Eumenes of Pergamum—but he rejected those he considered to be excessive (28.7.3–15). He later delayed the full Achaean levy's support of the Roman commander Q. Marcius Philippus; but he himself shared Marcius' dangers (28.13.1–7). Polybius became unwillingly involved in Roman factional politics between Philippus and the legate Ap. Claudius Cento. Cento had requested support from the Achaeans for operations in Epirus, but Marcius instructed Polybius to see to it that the Achaeans not comply with Cento's request. Polybius was in a delicate position (δυσχρήστου καὶ ποικίλης ὑποθέσεως, 28.13.11): he could not reveal Marcius' imperative to the Achaeans assembled at Sicyon, but opposing the request in public brought its own dangers. In the end he appealed to Achaean legalities, taking up the position of Philopoemen and Lycortas, arguing that the κοινόν could honor only such requests as had the sanction of a *senatus consultum*.<sup>63</sup> After leaving office, Polybius joined Archon and Lycortas in supporting an Achaean military mission on behalf of the Ptolemaic kingdom against Seleucid aggression, but he withdrew his support for this measure after Marcius Philippus urged the Achaeans to adopt the Roman policy of mediation (29.25.5–6). Polybius' independent political agency, then, had already been compromised before Pydna, for even on his own interpretation of events, he had had to steer a middle course between Achaean patriotism and politically necessary cooperation with Rome. Moreover, he had had first-hand experience of Roman duplicity. These events suggest that early on Polybius' political interactions with Romans, while he was still an important politician in the Achaean Confederation, were filled with complexity, discomfort, and embarrassment.<sup>64</sup> And it is worth remembering that none of Polybius' careful measures prevented his political exile to Rome.

It is therefore reasonable to see the defenses of Aristaenus as in part a defense of Polybius' own cautious policies. Another well-known passage, the "Fragment on Traitors," as a retrospective defense in Book 18 of Aristaenus' policy in 198, provides further evidence for both Polybius' apparent need to justify his own middle-of-the-road policy towards Rome and the presence of a persistent Achaean belief that the decision of 198 had somehow betrayed Achaean principles.<sup>65</sup> Dissident Achaean voices showed the continued popularity of Philopoemen over against the pro-Roman Aristaenus in 185; many Achaeans were deeply suspicious of Aristaenus and Diophanes for working in the Roman interest (Polyb. 22.10.14–15, 24.13.10).

62. Polyb. 28.6.1–9 with Pédech 1969, 255–58; Musti 1978, 77–78; Walbank 1985, 282–83.

63. On Achaean observation of legalities in relations with Rome, cf. Polyb. 22.12.5–10, 23.4.12–14; Livy (P) 38.32.8 (*foedus* with Rome or Sparta? —the evidence does not permit a certain conclusion: Badian 1952, p. 78 and n. 20), 39.37.9–10.

64. On these events, see Eckstein 1995, 5–6. The negative remarks on Roman *nova sapientia* in the 170s in a Polybian passage in Livy perhaps further reflect Polybius' discomfiture. See Livy (P) 42.47.9, with Briscoe 1964; Nissen 1863, 249–54, esp. 252 on the Polybian derivation.

65. Polyb. 18.13.1–15.17 (explicit mention of Aristaenus at 13.8–11), with the analysis of Eckstein 1987b; already Nissen 1863, p. 326, n. 2.



The Senate's vagueness and temporizing on the Spartan question dating from 189 and Roman irresolution regarding the repatriation of the exiles of 168, of whom Polybius was of course one, ensured continued hostility towards the Romans in some Achaean circles.<sup>66</sup>

In this context, one may well wonder how an Achaean readership would have read the passages in the *Histories* in which Romans emerge as practitioners of Hellenic λογισμός. On the basis of the long-standing Achaean reservations regarding the decision to join the Romans in 198 and Roman temporizing over both the Achaean exiles and the Spartan question, we have good reason to believe that Polybius' warm praise of the Roman achievement and his assimilationist treatment of Romans as "honorary Greeks" in such passages as 2.35 would hardly have been well received by some Achaean politicians. Further suspicions would have arisen from the fact that in a roughly twenty-year period the historian himself had moved from Achaean statesman to political prisoner at Rome to mentor of Scipio Aemilianus. And after the debacle of 146, he would serve as a mediator in the resettlement of Greece.<sup>67</sup>

Regarding Polybius' Greek, and especially Achaean, audiences, therefore, authorial motivations for indirectly (and occasionally directly) subverting the image of Romans as "honorary Greeks" and for demonstrating independent political agency are patent. Yet in light of Polybius' political predicament, there obviously would have been dangers in attempting to assert any such independence containing seeds of dissidence in blatantly overt terms. For this reason it may be best to reject a passage in Diodorus stating that the Romans hold onto their empire through the exercise of terror as Polybian.<sup>68</sup> On the other hand, Polybius overtly condemns Rome's theft (ἀφαίρεσις, 3.30.4) of Sardinia in the aftermath of the First Romano-Carthaginian War as an injustice (3.28.1–2, cf. 3.15.10) that led to the cataclysm of the Hannibalic War. He therefore seems to judge the Romans and their actions, by his own lights, independently.

Suggestions of Roman barbarism in Polybius' text take on meaning in this political context. Polybius believed that small states must sometimes make difficult and uncomfortable decisions, as Achaea had had to do in 198. Polybius clearly admired many qualities in the Romans, but the Achaean patriot was also able to assert his independence in giving voice to the negative aspects of Roman behavior. His representations of Romans as both

66. See conveniently Gruen 1984, 119–23 and literature cited there on Achaea's conflict with Sparta (p. 123: "The senate made a virtual science of ambiguity"); cf. Pédech 1969, 252–55 for a concise account of the frictions down to Polybius' hipparchy. For Polybius' own anger and disappointment over the hostage issue, see 30.32.1–12, 33.1.3–8 and 3.1–2.

67. For honors to Polybius throughout Greece for his role as mediator between Greece and Rome, see Paus. 8.9.2, 30.8–9, 37.2, 44.5, 48.9, with Ziegler 1952, cols. 1462–64; Polyb. 39.3.11–4.4, 5.2–6, 8.1–2, with Walbank 1977, 160–61; Schwertfeger 1974, *passim*, on the settlement of Achaea and its aftermath. See also the self-proclaimed patriotic services to Greece in the most parlous of times at 38.4.7–8.

68. Diod. 32.2, 4.4–5; Walbank 1985, 289–90; Eckstein 1995, 225–29; cf. Shimron 1979/80, pp. 106–7 and n. 46, and Ferrary 1988, 334–39, and p. 335, n. 217, for modern arguments, for and against. Shimron (1979/80, p. 101, n. 26) suggests that Polybius hints at censorship at 31.22.11. For Diodorus' use of Polybius, see Schwartz 1903, cols. 689–90; for an independent anti-Roman strain in Diodorus, see Sacks 1990 and 1994, *passim*.

“honorary Greeks” and as barbarians leave the Romans in an indeterminate cultural position.<sup>69</sup> In his engagement of a politics of cultural indeterminacy regarding Rome, the medium of the reported speech provided Polybius with a vehicle for practicing the art of relatively safe criticism. And in these speeches the pragmatic and realistic Achaean statesman of “the politics of the possible” also reveals an emotional allegiance to the impossible dream of complete and total Greek ἐλευθερία from the western barbarian.

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69. Cf. Musti 1978, 79: Polybius as “un uomo politico già sospettato di doppio giuoco.”

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